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THE POWER PARADOX: THE 
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES VIRGINIA MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION CASES 
INTRODUCTION 
Without advanced planning, minority shareholders in a closely 
held corporation can find themselves in the unenviable position of 
being up a creek without a paddle. Minority shareholders often 
invest in a corporation the belief that the investment will 
provide them with a steady stream of income, either from a job or 
from payment of dividends. 1 Yet many fail to protect themselves 
with employment contracts or buy-sell agreements, 2 leaving them 
vulnerable to a majority shareholder who may decide to fire them 
or withhold dividends. 3 Without a source of income, a minority 
shareholder can face an indefinite period when there is no return 
on his or her investment.4 
To address this problem, many states, including Virginia, have 
enacted some form of the Model Business Corporation Act (the 
"MBCA").5 The MBCA allows for involuntary dissolution of a cor-
1. See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 
Bus. LAW. 699, 702 (1993). 
2. See Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (Or At Least Understand VVhy You 
Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce Op-
pression in Closely Held Businesses?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 495-96 (2009). 
3. Thompson, supra note 1, at 703. 
4. Id. 
5. Harry Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as A Reme-
dy For Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 33 n.31 (1987). In order to 
adopt the MBCA, most states name their respective statute according to the model lan-
guage of section 1.01 of the MBCA which states: "This Act shall be known and may be cit-
ed as the '[name of state] Business Corporation Act." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 1.01 (2007); 
see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-601 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2014) (noting that Vir-
ginia chose the language "Virginia Stock Corporation Act"). Specific provisions within Vir-
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poration in certain circumstances.6 Dissolution, however, is con-
sidered a drastic remedy as it requires the corporation to enter 
into receivership and eventually be sold off.7 Because of this, 
courts are often hesitant to order dissolution except in cases of 
continued and egregious oppression. To address this problem, 
courts and legislatures in other jurisdictions have allowed equi-
table remedies, such as buy-outs or the appointment of a provi-
sional director, in cases of minority shareholder oppression. 8 
Although courts in other states have interpreted the MBCA's 
oppression provision as allowing equitable remedies, 9 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia has ruled that Virginia's oppression 
statutory scheme provides only for the exclusive remedy of disso-
lution.10 Accordingly, it is up to the General Assembly to add equi-
ginia's corporation legislation likewise appear identical or very similar. Compare MODEL 
Bus. CORP. ACT§ 14.30(a)(2)(ii) (2007) (the MBCA's oppression subsection within its over-
all dissolution provision), with VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.l-747(A)(l)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. 
Supp. 2013) (Virginia's oppression subsection within its overall dissolution provision). 
Id. 
6. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 14.30 (2007). Those circumstances include: 
[(1) where] the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate 
affairs, the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and irreparable 
injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered, or the business and 
affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the 
shareholders generally, because of the deadlock; [(2)] the directors or those in 
control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that 
is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent; [(3)] the shareholders are deadlocked in 
voting power and have failed, for a period that includes at least two consecu-
tive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have 
expired. 
7. See, e.g., Colgate v. Disthene Group, Inc., 85 Va. Cir. 286, 317 (2012) (Buckingham 
County); Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 9-10 (Wash. 2003); Drastic Times Call for 
Drastic Measures: A Fairfax County Judge Orders Judicial Dissolution in the Face of Mi-
nority Shareholder Oppression, RICH. B. ASS'N (Sept. 2012), http://www.richmondbar. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/business_law_tip_September_2012.pdf [hereinafter Dras-
tic Times]. 
8. See, e.g., Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269, 274-75 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Scott, 64 
P.3d at 10; cf. Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
9. See Scott, 64 P.3d at 9; Fix, 538 S.W.2d at 357 n.3 (providing a detailed discussion 
of certain equitable remedies used in various jurisdictions). 
10. Giannotti v. Hamway, 239 Va. 14, 28, 387 S.E.2d 725, 733 (1990); White v. Per-
kins, 213 Va. 129, 135, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972). The Supreme Court of Washington has 
interpreted the same statutory language, "a court ... may dissolve a corporation," as al-
lowing for equitable remedies up to and including dissolution. The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, on the other hand, has found the exact same language to only allow dissolution of a 
corporation and nothing more. Compare Scott, 64 P.3d at 9 (finding that alternative reme-
dies are available in addition to dissolution), with Giannoti, 239 Va. at 28, 387 S.E.2d at 
733 ("The remedy specified by the legislative while discretionary, is 'exclusive,' and does 
not permit the trial court to fashion other, apparently equitable remedies."). 
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table remedies to current statutory scheme. The time has now 
come for the General Assembly to take this step and ensure that 
trial courts have authority necessary to address instances of 
alleged oppression. 
Additional remedies are necessary to allow Virginia trial courts 
to respond to the unique circumstances presented in each case. 
Without additional remedies, trial courts are left with the choice 
of dissolution or dismissal, a stark contrast that ignores the 
murkiness of oppression in some cases. 11 To remedy this problem, 
this comment includes proposed draft legislation modeled after 
Oregon's dissolution statute. This new statute will provide Vir-
ginia courts with the flexibility needed to respond to the facts and 
circumstances presented in each unique oppression case. 
The proposed statute would add equitable remedies to Virgin-
ia's dissolution statute, allowing courts to order a wide range of 
non-exhaustive remedies including an accounting, damages, or 
the appointment of an individual as a provisional director. The 
proposed statute makes dissolution a last resort option that a 
court only considers after other remedies are deemed insufficient. 
Further, the statute allows forward-looking shareholders to opt-
out of most of the equitable remedies, excepting dissolution, dam-
ages, and an accounting, through agreement. Thus, the proposed 
statute addresses the problems inherent in a dissolution-only re-
gime while providing shareholders with the opportunity to struc-
ture deals avoid the effects of the statute. 
The proposed statute will help give teeth to a law that Virginia 
courts are currently hesitant to apply. 12 Although Virginia's op-
pression statute provides some protection to minority sharehold-
ers, it is not generally seen as particularly protective. 13 Instead, 
Virginia calls for significant deference to a corporation's 
management under the business judgment rule, which creates a 
11. The Virginia statute does provide one other option, a pre-trial buy-out; however, 
only the defendant or the corporation may elect to buy-out the plaintiff and end the case. 
See VA. CODEANN. § 13.1-749.l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
12. See, e.g., Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 304. 
13. Drastic Times, supra note 7. It should be noted that Virginia Code section§ 13.1-
74 7 is written such that oppression is addressed as a subsection within the overall dissolu-
tion statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-74 7 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). Despite this 
construction, the oppression provision has become the thrust of the statute. For this rea-
son, this article uses the term "oppression statute" when technically referencing the disso-
lution statute generally, of which oppression is addressed in a subsection. 
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presumption that a director of a corporation has discharged 
duties "in accordance with his good faith business judgment of the 
best interests of the corporation."14 While many states apply an 
objective standard to a director's decisions in running a corpora-
tion, Virginia applies a subjective view of the director's good faith 
business judgment.15 
Despite this highly deferential atmosphere, the recent Virginia 
case of Colgate v. Disthene Group shows that Virginia courts 
not defer to a corporation's directors in any and all circumstanc-
es.16 Colgate involved a decades-long over 
management of a kyanite mine and other operations, 
lectively were worth millions. 17 The · court 
ness judgment rule was inapplicable as it required 
"actually exercise their good business judgment."18 
court found there was "no reason to believe that management 
of Disthene will ever treat the Plaintiffs fairly," dissolution was 
the appropriate remedy. 19 
This comment addresses where Virginia's current scheme falls 
short and why equitable remedies are needed in Virginia 
ty shareholder oppression cases. Part I looks at how 
attempted to solve the problem of minority shareholder oppres-
sion. Part II explores how other jurisdictions have interpreted or 
added to the MBCA so as to provide additional remedies 
nority shareholder oppression cases. Finally, Part advocates 
for adoption of a new dissolution statute in Virginia that includes 
equitable remedies for such cases. 
14. VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). 
15. Compare In re MFW Shareholders Litig., 67 A.2d 496, 500 (Del. Ch. 2013) (ex-
plaining Delaware's business judgment rule is an objective standard: "Under [Delaware's 
business judgment rule) the court is precluded from inquiring into the substantive fairness 
of [a director's decision] ... unless [that decision was] so disparate that no rational person 
acting in good faith could have thought the [decision] was fair to the minority.") (emphasis 
added), with VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013) (stating that 
courts consider whether a director fulfilled his duties in "accordance with his good faith 
business judgment") (emphasis added). 
16. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 317. 
17. Id. at 287-88; see also Bill McKelway, Jurists Rejects Appeal of Firm's Dissolution; 
Va. High Court Refuses Kyanite Company's Bid to Overturn Liquidation, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 17, 2013, at BOl ("In all, Disthene holdings are believed to be valued at 
some $200 million."). 
18. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 294 (emphasis added). 
19. Id. at 317. 
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I. 
environment is particularly prone to 
abuse shareholders who fail to protect themselves. 20 
These corporations are often started by friends or family mem-
bers with little or no business experience. 21 Furthermore, the ini-
tial shareholders often decide against consulting an attorney, 
finding it an unnecessary expense. 22 determining that minority 
shareholders should be protected from abuse, many states, in-
Virginia,23 have enacted the 24 The MBCA offers 
some protection to shareholders who might otherwise be 
stuck position of possessing stock without the 
25 Virginia's General Assembly has also 
enacting a pre-trial buy-out remedy, 
defendants or the corporation to buy-out the 
interest the corporation prior to trial.26 
describes the problems unique to closely held corpo-
current statutory scheme fails to ade-
Corporations 
Minority invest in corporations with their 
family or possess a useful skillset and plan to 
work the Thus, many shareholders invest with 
the belief that investment will lead to steady income, either 
or dividends. 29 Minority shareholders often fail, 
to protect themselves before buying into a corporation 
20. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 702. 
21. Id.; Molitor, supra note 2, at 491. 
22. See Molitor, supra note 2, at 491-93. 
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-60 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013); id. § 13.l-
747(A)(l)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). 
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.0101 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1-01 (2013); see also 
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 1.01 (2007) (outlining the model provision language with which 
specific states may adopt the MBCA). 
25. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 14.30 (2007). 
26. VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-749.l (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
27. See Molitor, supra note 2, at 491. 
28. Thompson, supra note 1, at 702. 
29. Id. 
' 
,, 
1;, 
I' 
I 
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by not utilizing employment contracts or 
Without any protection, minority 
to the decisions of the majority shareholder, 
terminate the minority shareholder or reduce dividend pay-
ments. 31 This lack of control can leave 
shareholder facing an indefinite 
earning any income back 
shareholders, through no 
position when they 
As an example of how a 
corporation and to engage 
sary to protect himself, consider 
Individuals A, B, and C, all 
poration to make widgets. All three have an 
corporation, each owning 33% the stock. 
ployed in various positions of the 
to draft an employment 
buy-sell arrangement or any 
together. three 
employees is protected. 
widgets, with all three partners 
and dividend payouts, personality 
that align A and B against C. 
a 
the directors, A and B decide to fire C cut dividend payments 
while increasing their own salaries. This leaves C with no protec-
tion, having been "frozen out"33 of a business that helped ere-
30. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company: 
Learning (or Not) From Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 912 
(2005) ("Because close corporation owners are frequently linked by family or other person-
al relationships, there is often an initial atmosphere of mutual trust that diminishes the 
sense that contractual protection is needed."); see also, Molitor, supra note 2, at 493, 496 
(referring more generally to ways in which minority shareholders fail to protect them-
selves at the outset). Buy-sell agreements can be drafted numerous ways, but may include 
provisions addressing who can buy the stock, what price the stock will be sold for, and 
what events might trigger a buyout. See Robert W. Wood, In Business? Get a Buy-Sell 
Agreement!, FORBES.COM (Feb. 7, 2011, 9:07 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood 
12011/02/07 /in-business-get-a-buy-sell-agreement/. 
31. Thompson, supra note 1, at 703. 
32. Id. 
33. The term "frozen out" essentially means being cut off from the business both in 
terms of decision making and profiting therefrom. It is commonly used to signal oppres-
sion in the closely held corporation context. See infra note 35. 
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ate. With a minority interest, as long as A and B stay aligned in 
their decision-making, C has no way to force any change in the 
corporation and is left in the unenviable position of a 
nancial interest with no return on his investment. To make mat-
ters worse, C has lost his primary source of income-employment 
at ABC Corporation. Finally, since this is a closely held corpora-
tion, with no shares listed on a public stock exchange, C has no 
market in which to sell his interest. Looking were C to 
bring a successful claim for oppression, the remedy 
available to the court is dissolution of corporation-a forced 
sale of the business. Of course, A and B could step the 
corporation back, which would essentially amount to a 
C's interest, but only if A and B have enough assets to pur-
chase the corporation or secure a loan for the purchase. both A 
and B's money is tied up in ABC Corporation, as is often the case, 
then A and B might not be able to come up with the funds, and 
the business could be purchased by someone else. 
As is clear from hypothetical above, minority shareholders 
invest in a corporation with high hopes big dreams. 
shareholders often do not stop to consider 
relationships sour and, instead, rely on the idea that their per-
sonal relationships with the other investors will survive, and 
hopefully even thrive, in the business world. 34 many cases, 
however, the pressure of making business decisions can cause 
rifts in those relationships that eventually lead to the "freezing 
out"35 of one, or possibly more, of the minority shareholders. 
If C, in the above hypothetical, considered suing for dissolution, 
he would have to lay out exactly how A and B acted oppressively. 
Although central to determining whether or not dissolution is ap-
propriate, the MBCA and many state statutes fail to define op-
pression. Instead, state courts have stepped in to provide a defini-
tion. The Supreme Court of Virgini:;i. opined in VVhite v. Perkins 
that oppression is "a visible departure from the standards of fair 
dealing, and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder 
34. See Moll, supra note 30, at 912. 
35. Id. at 889-90. "Standard freeze-out techniques include the refusal to declare divi-
dends, the termination of a minority shareholder's employment, the removal of a minority 
shareholder from a position of management, and the siphoning off of corporate earnings 
through high compensation to the majority shareholder, quite often, these tactics are used 
in combination." Id. 
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who entrusts money to a company is entitled to rely."36 The 
Supreme Court of Carolina has listed several relevant fac-
tors in finding a violation of fair dealing or fair play, including: 
"exclusion from management, withholding of dividends, paying 
excessive salaries to majority shareholders, and analogous activi-
ties."37 Other factors courts have considered include abusive con-
duct, recurring breaches of fiduciary duty, or frustration of a 
shareholder's reasonable expectations."38 
B. Virginia's of MBCA's Oppression Provision 
Virginia the MBCA in 1956.39 Under the MBCA, a 
court may order a corporation dissolved certain specific, exclu-
sive circumstances. 40 One of those circumstances is when the di-
rectors, or those in control, have "acted, are acting, or will act in a 
manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent."41 The law is 
specific about remedies available to the court, stating that a trial 
court may dissolve a corporation if the plaintiff establishes that 
one of the circumstances has been met. 42 The statute does not ex-
pressly allow for any other remedy, and Virginia courts have in-
terpreted Virginia's version of the MBCA as providing for only 
one remedy, dissolution, an oppression case. 43 
36. 213 Va. 129, 134, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972) (citations omitted). 
37. See Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 266 n.25 (S.C. 
2001); see also Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 377, 386-87 (2004) (noting that most state statutes allowing for dissolution due 
to oppression fail to define oppression, leaving the courts to supply a definition). 
38. See Siegel, supra note 37, at 387. 
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94 (1950) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 
(Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013)). 
40. Id.§ 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013)). 
41. Id. § 13.l-747(A)(l)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). The other two cir-
cumstances are where: 
[t]he directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs, the 
shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and irreparable injury to the 
corporation is threatened or being suffered, or the business and affairs of the 
corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders 
generally, because of the deadlock; or (2) [t]he shareholders are deadlocked in 
voting power and have failed, for a period that includes at least two consecu-
tive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have 
expired. 
Id.§§ 13.l-747(A)(l)(a), (c) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). 
42. Id.§ 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). 
43. See, e.g., White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 135, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972). 
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The Supreme Court of Virginia first considered the issue of 
whether the MBCA provided for equitable remedies v. 
Perkins. 44 In White, the plaintiff and the defendant a cor-
poration with the defendant as the controlling shareholder. 45 The 
corporation, at the insistence of the defendant, never declared nor 
paid dividends. 46 Because the plaintiff was required to pay income 
taxes on money that he was not receiving, he became "financially 
pressed."47 Despite his awareness of the plaintiff's financial situa-
tion, the defendant still refused to declare or pay dividends or, al-
ternatively, agree to a buy-out of either his stock or the plaintiff's 
stock.48 
The trial court found that the defendant majority shareholder 
oppressed the plaintiff minority shareholder and ordered cor-
poration to declare and pay dividends, as well as other remedies.49 
On appeal, the supreme court held that, while the trial court 
could have ordered the dissolution of the corporation, the court 
could not, under the statute, order any alternative remedies. 50 In 
determining that dissolution was the only statutorily available 
option, the court stated that Virginia's oppression provision 
"clearly shows an intent by the General Assembly that the alter-
natives provided there are exclusive rather than inclusive."51 
Thus, the court in an oppression case is faced with the choice of 
either dissolving the corporation or dismissing the case. 52 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 131, 189 S.E.2d at 317. 
46. Id., 189 S.E.2d at 318. 
47. Id. at 131-32, 189 S.E.2d at 318. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 130, 189 S.E.2d at 317. 
50. Id. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320. It should be noted that in VVhite, the court did state 
that it clearly could have appointed a custodian with power to continue the business. Id. 
It is likely that the VVhite court was alluding to the remedy currently codified at Virginia 
Code section 13.l-748(A) which permits a court to appoint a custodian to manage the cor-
poration "while the proceeding is pending." VA CODE ANN. § 13.1-748(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011) 
(emphasis added). This, however, is a temporary appointment only. Thus when reading 
the appointment language in VVhite, one should place his or her emphasis on the exclusivi-
ty of dissolution. It is VVhite's holding that the alternatives to dissolution are exclusive, not 
inclusive. VVhite, 213 Va. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320. Several subsequent Virginia decisions, 
holding that dissolution is the only alternative available to a court in Virginia, support 
this interpretation. See infra note 56. 
51. VVhite, 213 Va. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320. 
52. See id. Again, while the VVhite court seemed to indicate that there might be anoth-
er available alternative (i.e., appointing a custodian to continue the business), this Ian-
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In finding that dissolution was the only available remedy, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia did not elaborate as to why it reached 
this conclusion, except for implying that the conclusion was obvi-
ous from the statutory language. 53 Along with this textual analy-
sis, the court may have based its opinion on other considerations, 
including the knowledge that minority shareholders are often-
times able to pursue other causes of actions that provide alterna-
tive remedies, 64 and the idea that courts should promote the use 
of contracts to protect minority shareholders before a business 
deal is finalized, as opposed to courts providing the sole protec-
tion. 56 Subsequent Virginia opinions have followed the lVhite 
court in finding that dissolution is the only remedy available to a 
trial court in oppression cases.66 In Giannotti v. Hamway, 
court held that "[t]he remedy specified by the legislature [dissolu-
tion], while discretionary, is 'exclusive' and does not permit the 
trial court to fashion other, apparently equitable remedies."67 In 
short, lVhite and other courts have narrowly construed the reme-
dies available for cases of shareholder oppression. Under the cur-
rent scheme, dissolution is wholly favored over the recognition of 
other equitable remedies. 
C. Virginia's Pre-Trial Buyout Option 
Following several decades where the only option in oppression 
cases was dissolution, the General Assembly enacted a statute 
that allows for a pre-trial buyout. Under Virginia Code section 
guage would appear to contradict the overall holding in White and how subsequent Virgin-
ia courts have interpreted it and it should be viewed as dicta. See supra note 50. To the 
extent that such a remedy is indeed available, it is only a temporary solution. Virginia 
courts have not appointed a custodian as a permanent remedy in oppression cases. 
53. White, 213 Va. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320. 
54. For example, a minority shareholder could bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
55. In most cases, minority shareholders can protect themselves by entering into em-
ployment agreements, buy-sell agreements, and other contracts prior to investing in a cor-
poration. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-80 (Del. 1993). 
The tools of good corporate practice are designed to give a purchasing minori-
ty stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting with 
consideration. It would do violence to normal corporate practice and our cor-
poration law to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-
imposed stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not contracted. 
Id. However, minority shareholders who inherit their shares do not have this opportunity. 
56. See, e.g., Stickley v. Stickley, 43 Va. Cir. 123, 144-46 (1997) (Rockingham County); 
Giannotti v. Hamway, 239 Va. 14, 28-29, 387 S.E.2d 725, 733-34 (1990); Jordon v. Bow-
man Apple Prod. Co., 728 F. Supp. 409, 415 (W.D. Va. 1990). 
57. Giannotti, 239 Va. at 28, 387 S.E.2d at 733. 
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13. 1, a corporation or a shareholder in the corporation, can 
elect to buy the shares of the complaining shareholder. 58 An 
tion, however, must be made within ninety days of the 
suit for dissolution, or "at such later time as the court 
cretion may allow."59 The election must be done to 
once the election is made, a fair value of the shares will be 
uu.uvu. either by agreement among the parties or, if they are una-
to agree, by the court. 60 An election is 
determines that it is equitable to set aside or 
election."61 After the fair value of the shares is 
court must enter an order directing the purchase of 
may also award the petitioning shareholder 
torney fees expert fees if the court determines 
tioner's claims under section 13.1-747 were meritorious. 62 
ther, once a buy-out order is entered, the court must dismiss 
petition to dissolve, and the petitioning shareholder 
ha[s] any rights or status as a shareholder of the corporation, ex-
cept the right to receive the amounts awarded to by 
of the court."63 
The buy-out alternative was enacted to provide a "less 
remedy" in cases of shareholder conflict, while at the same 
time ensuring that no shareholder had a tactical advantage over 
the other shareholders.64 With the possibility of a buy-
out, a shareholder interested pursuing dissolution now must 
consider the potential exposure that he risks to a pre-trial buy-
out.65 As one trial court observed, "[i]t is perhaps an 
result of the statute that a plaintiff who originally sought to dis-
solve a corporation ends up in a proceeding to establish value 
provides for no formal discovery."66 Thus, pursuing dissolution 
might lead to a forced sale in a proceeding where the plaintiff 
58. VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-749.l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
59. Id.§ 13.1-749.l(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
60. Id.§ 13.1-749.l(C)-(D) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
61. Id.§ 13.1-749.l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
62. Id.§ 13.1-749.l(E) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
63. Id.§ 13.1-749.l(F) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
64. Allen C. Goolsby & Louanna 0. Heuhsen, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Corpo-
rate and Business Law, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 165, 194 (2005). 
65. See id. 
66. Hartley v. Marco Invs., Inc., 82 Va. Cir. 294, 295 (2011) (Norfolk City). 
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does not have formal access to discovery may be left w1tn an 
agreement that contains unfavorable terms. 67 
D. Colgate v. Disthene Group 
Since the enactment of the pre-trial buyout, Virginia has only 
seen two cases involving minority shareholder oppression go to 
trial. 68 The most recent case, Colgate v. Disthene Group, involved 
two sides of a family fighting over the management of a prosper-
ous business in Buckingham County.69 As one local news reporter 
summarized, this case "redefined Virginia business law, [and] ex-
posed the withering business practices of a generations-old 
mining and landholding concern."70 
The Colgate case focused on the complicated and dramatic rela-
tionships between the descendants of Guy Dixon, who first 
bought a kyanite at a bankruptcy sale in 1945. 71 After Dix-
on's death, one side of the family inherited a majority of the 
shares, including all of the voting stock, 72 while the other side 
herited a minority share all non-voting stock. 73 Following sev-
eral years of low dividend payments and evidence of "exorbitant" 
salaries, the minority shareholders filed suit against the majority 
shareholders. 74 The minority shareholders asserted, among other 
allegations, that they were being oppressed, accusing the majori-
ty shareholders of authorizing large bonuses while cutting 
dends. 75 The minority shareholders sought dissolution the 
thene Group. 76 
67. Id.; Goolsby & Heuhsen, supra note 64, at 194. 
68. The first case, Cattano v. Bragg, centered on whether a minority shareholder 
could simultaneously bring a derivative suit and an individual action for judicial dissolu-
tion. 283 Va. 638, 643, 727 S.E.2d 625, 626 (2012). 
69. 85 Va. Cir. 286, 287-89 (2012) (Buckingham County). 
70. Bill McKelway, Chase City Man Finally Prevails in Kyanite Case, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH (Sept. 23, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/state-regional/ 
chase-city-man-finally-prevails-in-kyanite-case/article_1129d777-ad2f-5ec3-acde-flbfd742 
f5dc.html [hereinafter McKelway, Chase City Man]. 
71. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 287. 
72. Id. at 288. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 289. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
2014] 
The tnal co1 
majority share 
from the stand 
that the major: 
ments as retal 
minority share: 
shareholders a, 
larger bonuses 
sion, court 
treated as irks' 
ably by squeez 
their dividendi 
wherewithal tc 
that dissoluti01 
dissolved. 81 
Following tb 
considered a i: 
proach to the J 
The plaintiffs ' 
bolster · 
because of the 
holders."83 The 
agreed to buy , 
to the SupremE 
Another Viri 
ly working its 
loved Virginia 
77. Id. at 295, 2' 
78. Id. at 296. 
79. Id. at 297. 
80. Id. at 316-1 
81. Id. at 317. 
82. Drastic Timi 
83. Id. 
84. Bill McKelv 
DISPATCH, June 11, 
85. The Supren: 
then petitioned for 
McKelway, Kyanite. 
(June 10, 2013, 12 
ing-to-virginia-suprE 
inafter McKelway, 11 
[Vol. 49:287 
be an 
rginia has only 
)pression go to 
iroup, involved 
it of a prosper-
[ news reporter 
[and] ex-
ions-old 
dramatic rela-
~on, who first 
15. 11 After Dix-
iajority of the 
~ other side in-
Following sev-
of "exorbitant" 
3t the majority 
l, among other 
ng the majori-
e cutting 
of the Dis-
inority shareholder 
for judicial dissolu-
Case, RICH. TIMES-
1ews/state-regional/ 
ec3-acde-fl bfd 7 42 
2014] NEED FOR ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES 299 
The trial court found that several of the actions taken by the 
majority shareholders were oppressive and "visibly depart[ed] 
from the standards of fair dealing."77 The court first determined 
that the majority shareholders purposely withheld dividend pay-
ments as retaliation for previous trust litigation pursued by the 
minority shareholders.78 The court further found that the majority 
shareholders awarded themselves "enormous pay raises and even 
larger bonuses" during the same period of time. 79 In its conclu-
sion, the court stated that the minority shareholders "been 
treated as irksome interlopers, problems to be dealt prefer-
ably by squeezing them out at a below market price, or slashing 
dividends in the hope of depriving them of financial 
to seek legal recourse."80 The trial court then held 
dissolution was appropriate and ordered the Disthene Group 
dissolved. 81 
Following the trial court's order of dissolution, this case was 
considered a potential "turning in Virginia's judicial ap-
proach to the rights and protections of minority shareholders."82 
The expert witness opined that the holding would "help 
bolster minority shareholder investment in Virginia companies 
because of the protections the decision carries for minority share-
holders."83 The parties ultimately settled, wherein the defendants 
agreed to buy out the plaintiffs for $70 million,84 after an appeal 
to Supreme Court of Virginia was eventually granted.85 
Virginia case involving possible oppression is current-
ly working its way through the courts. The case involves the be-
loved Virginia landmark, Luray Caverns, owned by the Graves 
77. Id. at 295, 298. 
78. Id. at 296. 
79. Id. at 297. 
80. Id.at316-17. 
81. Id. at 317. 
82. Drastic Times, supra note 7. 
83. Id. 
84. Bill McKelway, Kyanite Mining Case Finally Comes to a Close, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, June 11, 2013, at Bl. 
85. The Supreme Court of Virginia denied the first appeal request. The defendants 
then petitioned for a rehearing, which was granted by the supreme court. See Bill 
McKelway, Kyanite Mining Case Going to Virginia Supreme Court, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH 
(June 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/kyanite-mining-case-go 
ing-to-virginia-supreme-court/article_d5e573ca-alal-51f6-80cl-fe573536ce28.html [here-
inafter McKelway, Mining Case Going to Virginia Supreme Court]. 
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family and worth approximately $20 million. 86 Prior to the death 
of their parents, there were several internal disputes among the 
six siblings over who should run the caverns and who should be 
trustee for the family's multiple trusts. 87 The fighting exploded in-
to multiple lawsuits over the last several decades, with accusa-
tions against one sibling for creating "golden parachutes" for her-
self and two of her brothers, and against that same sibling for 
acting "imperial" when she managed the caverns and freezing out 
another brother from all decision-making.ss 
Although the Luray case is still pending, the Colgate decision 
has important implications for how the case may turn out. With 
what appears to be a similar fact pattern, including one side of 
the family controlling the business and providing themselves with 
excessive monetary benefit, it is quite possible that any trial al-
leging oppression could result in dissolution. 89 Even without the 
Supreme Court of Virginia ultimately deciding the Colgate case, 
the combination of the trial court's decision90 and the high settle-
ment in Colgate may provide the Luray defendants with addi-
tional incentive to settle any case alleging oppression to avoid 
risking dissolution. 
Virginia's statutory scheme currently offers only limited reme-
dies in minority shareholder oppression cases. A plaintiff can at-
tempt to negotiate an informal resolution with the majority 
shareholders or sue for dissolution. 91 After suit has been filed, the 
corporation or other shareholders have the option to buy-out the 
92 Once the case gets to trial, however, the only remedy 
86. Ken Otterbourg, The Rift-A Family Dynasty Fights Over the Future of Luray 
Caverns, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2013, at A-101. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. See id. 
90. Professor Carl Tobias, a law professor at the University of Richmond School of 
Law, who closely followed the case opined that the circuit court's "careful opinion will 
withstand scrutiny [by the supreme court] because [the judge's] ruling on the law was cor-
rect and [the judge] is closest to the underlying facts, having heard weeks of testimony at 
the trial level." McKelway, Mining Case Going to Virginia Supreme Court, supra note 85. 
91. Cf. James Irving, Minority Shareholder Rights in Virginia, BEAN KINNEY & 
KORMAN PC (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.beankinney.com/publications-articles-minority-
shareholder-rights-virginia.html (noting that the business judgment rule is a potential 
defense for defendants in dissolution suits but only if they have not wholly refused to par-
ticipate in the informal negotiation process). 
92. See source cited supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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available to the judge is dissolution. 93 Recognizing the limitations 
inherent in the MBCA's oppression provision, other jurisdictions 
have expanded the remedies available to courts in oppression 
cases.
94 
II. LESSONS LEARNED FROM REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS 
A majority of states have enacted the MBCA, which provides 
for an oppression cause of action. 95 Delaware, however, has decid-
ed against allowing oppression causes of action, instead finding 
that minority shareholders in such circumstances are protected 
by fiduciary duty requirements. Of those states that allow op-
pression cases, many have allowed additional remedies besides 
dissolution. Courts in some states, such as Washington and Mis-
souri, have interpreted the oppression provision in the MBCA as 
granting a wide range of remedies. 96 Legislatures in other states, 
such as Illinois, have explicitly added alternative remedies to 
their statutes.97 Virginia should follow the lead of other MBCA 
states that allow equitable remedies in oppression cases. 
A Requiring Minority Shareholders to Protect Themselves on the 
Front End 
Delaware, the "pre-eminent jurisdiction in corporate law,"98 has 
not adopted the MBCA. Instead, Delaware case law provides for a 
cause of action based on breach of fiduciary duties owed to minor-
ity shareholders by majority shareholders but does not recognize 
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013); see also supra 
notes 50-57 (noting the exclusively of dissolution as remedy for oppression). 
94. See infra Part II. 
95. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 1.01, 14.30 (2007); Haynsworth, supra note 5, at 33 
n.31; see also supra note 5 (for more discussion on the adoption of the MBCA and its op-
pression provision). 
96. Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 9-10 (Wash. 2003); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 
538 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
97. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.50(b) (2013) ("As an alternative to dissolution, the court 
may order any of the other remedies contained in subsection (b) of Section 12.55") (refer-
ring to the remedies of appointing a custodian to manage the business or the appointing of 
a provisional director to serve for a particular term under court-prescribed terms). 
98. Siegel, supra note 37, at 378. 
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an oppression cause of action. Although an oppression claim was 
once heard by a Delaware Chancery Court judge in Litle v. Wa-
ters,99 the Supreme Court of Delaware quickly overruled this opin-
ion and elucidated that minority shareholders of closely held cor-
porations in Delaware could not bring a case alleging 
. 100 
oppression. 
Litle was the first Delaware case to recognize a separate cause 
of action for oppression by minority shareholders and some found 
the opinion surprising. 101 The idea that oppression could be a sep-
arate cause of action under Delaware common law was short-
lived. In 1993, one year after the Litle opinion was announced, a 
different chancery court judge stated: "I do not read Litle as es-
tablishing an independent cause of action for 'oppressive abuse of 
discretion' distinct from a cause of action based on a breach of fi-
duciary "102 This line of reasoning was similarly adopted by 
the Delaware Supreme Court, which held in Nixon v. Blackwell 
that there was no separate cause of action based on oppression. 103 
In Nixon, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants attempted 
to force a sale of the plaintiffs stock back to the corporation by 
cutting dividends and breached "their fiduciary duties by author-
izing excessive compensation for themselves and other employ-
ees," among other allegations. 104 The trial court ordered a buy-out 
of the plaintiffs' stock. 100 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware reversed, finding that the trial court's judgment went 
against the "well established ... jurisprudence that stockholders 
need not always be treated equally for all purposes."106 In so hold-
ing, the court found it significant that the plaintiffs were neither 
employees of the corporation nor were they "protected by specific 
provisions in the certificate of incorporation, by-laws, or a stock-
holders' agreement."107 Further, the court went on to state that if 
99. 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25, at *25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 1992). 
100. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-80 (Del. 1993). 
101. Id. 
102. Garza v. TV Answer, Inc., No. 12784 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40, at *19 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 11, 1993). 
103. Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1379-80. 
104. Id. at 1373. 
105. Id. at 1373-74. 
106. Id. at 1376. 
107. Id. at 1377. 
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equality in the treatment of stockholders were necessary in cor-
porate decision-making, was a matter for the Delaware legis-
lature to decide, not the courts. 108 Accordingly, minority share-
holders of closely held corporations incorporated in Delaware 
cannot bring an independent claim of oppression. 
In coming to the conclusion that Delaware law does not require 
equal treatment of stockholders, the Nixon court sympathized 
with the dilemma which minority shareholders face when at-
tempting to receive the fair market value for their stock with no 
market valuation. 109 The court, however, explained that any sym-
pathy was "in the abstract" only, as any stock purchaser in reality 
could bargain for more control and more rights before purchasing 
the stock. 110 In so doing, the stock purchaser "make[s] a business 
judgment whether to buy into such a minority position, and if so 
on what terms."111 The stock purchaser further has the ability to 
protect himself on the front-end by entering into stockholder 
agreements that "provide for elaborate earnings tests, buy-out 
provisions, voting trusts, or other voting agreements."112 Thus, the 
Nixon court found that "[t]he tools of good corporate practice are 
designed to give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportuni-
ty to bargain for protection before parting with consideration."113 
Finally, the court held that "[i]t would do violence to normal cor-
porate practice and our corporation law to fashion an ad hoc rul-
ing which would result in a court-imposed stockholder buy-out for 
which the parties had not contracted."114 
In disallowing shareholder oppression actions, the Nixon court 
clearly believed that Delaware law provides sufficient protection 
for minority shareholders through the courts' commitment to en-
forcing fiduciary duties. 115 Delaware courts still "critically exam-
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 1379. 
110. Id. at 1379-80. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1380. 
113. Id. (emphasis added). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 1379-81 ("It would run counter to the spirit of the doctrine of independent 
legal significance ... for this Court to fashion a special judicially-created rule for minority 
investors .... "); see also Siegel, supra note 37, at 404 ("Subsequently, the Delaware Su-
preme Court in Nixon confirmed ... that there is no separate cause of action for oppres-
sion or for frustration of reasonable expectations."). By discouraging litigation, Delaware 
Ii j 
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ine otherwise ordinary decisions that were, in reality, designed to 
starve out the minority shareholder."116 Thus, "while shareholders 
in [Delaware] will not have their reasonable expectations or mere 
preferences satisfied, it is a gross exaggeration to assume that 
courts in these states would permit these shareholders to be 
b d "117 H . h D 1 ' . f . d a use . owever, given t at e aware s entire airness stan -
ard does not require equality, there is still the possibility that a 
financial freeze-out may result, or alternatively, may be allowed 
to persist due to a court's hesitancy to find oppression under the 
doctrine of entire fairness. 118 
Although front-end protection through contract is ideal, and 
should be encouraged by the courts, simply expecting a minority 
shareholder to protect himself upfront ignores the reality of who 
most minority shareholders are and what information is available 
to them prior to purchasing a minority interest in a corporation.119 
First, those involved in a closely held corporation are frequently 
friends or family members. 120 These personal relationships help 
create "an initial atmosphere of mutual trust that diminishes the 
sense that contractual protection is needed."121 To correct this 
courts may also be trying to prevent the significant corporate turmoil that accompanies 
litigation. As one commentator noted, "[t]raditional litigation of such shareholder disputes 
may be the legal equivalent of killing the goose that lays the golden egg." Susan Marma-
duke, A Statutory Escape Route: Shareholder Disputes, 70 OR. ST. B. BULL. 36, 36 (2010). 
In such circumstances, "[b]y the time the parties' rights are finally adjudicated, the com-
pany may be damaged beyond repair: Working relationships are destroyed; legal fees and 
costs are crushing; and key employees are distracted from attending to the needs of the 
enterprise and its customers." Id. 
116. Siegel, supra note 37, at 453. 
117. Id. at 457. 
118. See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1381. The entire fairness standard requires two things: fair 
dealing and a fair pricing. 
The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it 
was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the 
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter as-
pect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the 
proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earn-
ings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or in-
herent value of a company's stock. 
Id. at 1376 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983)). Although 
entire fairness is a more stringent standard than the deferential business judgment rule, 
it does not require shareholders to be treated equally, as made clear by the Nixon court. 
Id. 
119. See Moll, supra note 30, at 912. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
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mentality, states could enact legislation that would require own-
ers of limited liability companies and corporations to read warn-
ings about the risks of starting a business or "purchasing an equi-
ty interest in an existing closely-held [corporation]" without 
advanced planning. 122 Increasing the educational opportunities 
available to owners would increase the likelihood of advance 
planning, subsequently provide for better protection of a mi-
nority shareholder's interests. 123 
B. Interpreting the Oppression Provision as Expansive and 
Allowing Alternative Remedies 
Courts in other jurisdictions that have enacted the MBCA, in-
cluding Washington and Missouri, have interpreted their statutes 
to allow for remedies up to and including dissolution in minority 
shareholder oppression cases. 124 The Supreme Court of Washing-
ton and the Missouri Court of Appeals have both held that the 
MBCA does not limit a court's equitable power. 125 
1. Washington 
In Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton held that the MBCA's oppression provision allows for equita-
ble remedies other than dissolution. 126 The plaintiff in Scott filed 
suit against the defendant alleging, among other things, oppres-
sion and misapplication or waste of corporate assets. 127 The plain-
122. Molitor, supra note 2, at 496. 
123. Id. at 581, 585. Again, however, one must consider the mentality of an unsophisti-
cated shareholder starting a corporation (who might breeze through any reading material 
provided him by the state) and those shareholders who inherited their interest in the cor-
poration. 
124. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.494 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.); WASH. 
REV. CODE§ 23B.14.300 (2012); see, e.g., ALA. CODE§ lOA-2-14.30 (LexisNexis 2013); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN.§ 10-11430 (2013); ARK CODE ANN.§ 4-33-1430 (2001); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 30-1-1430 (2013); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 
(2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of 2014 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-lA-1430 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-24-301 
(2012). 
125. Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 4-5, 9 (Wash. 2003); Fix v. Fix Material 
Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 356-57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
126. Scott, 64 P.3d at 9-10. 
127. Id. at 4. 
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tiff requested dissolution, which the trial court granted. 128 The 
Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, finding no 
abuse of discretion by the trial court. 129 The Supreme Court of 
Washington reversed the order of dissolution, holding that the ev-
idence presented in support of dissolution was not sufficient for 
such a drastic remedy when other, less drastic remedies could 
have been ordered by the trial court and were appropriate under 
the circumstances. 130 
Washington's oppression statute, just like Virginia's, states 
that a trial court may dissolve a corporation if there is oppres-
sion.131 In determining that the statute allowed for remedies other 
than oppression, the Supreme Court of Washington reasoned that 
dissolution suits were "fundamentally equitable in nature."132 Re-
lying on this conclusion, the court reasoned that trial courts faced 
with an oppression case could consider alternative equitable rem-
edies.133 Those remedies included: (1) an entry an order requir-
ing dissolution at a future date if the shareholders not come 
to an agreement; (2) appointment of a receiver to run the affairs 
of the corporation; and (3) "an award of damages to [the] minority 
shareholders . . . for any injury suffered by them."134 The Scott 
court further found that "[d]issolution should not be granted as a 
matter of right, since the provision allowing judicial dissolution is 
'clearly couched in language of permission."'135 Thus, while Wash-
ington's oppression statute "grants ... courts discretion to dis-
solve a corporation when those in control of the corporation are 
acting oppressively," the courts should not exercise such discre-
tion unless "a remedy as severe as involuntary dissolution" is 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 10. 
131. WASH. REV. CODE§ 23B.14.300(2)(b) (2012). 
132. Scott, 64 P.3d at 9. 
133. Id. (citing Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)). 
134. Id. (quoting Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395-96 (Or. 
1973)). 
135. Id. at 5 (quoting Henry George & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper-George, Inc., 632 P.2d 512, 
516 (Wash. 1981)). 
2014] 
necessary give: 
court's lead, or1 
2. Missouri 
The Missour 
not an exclush 
al Co., the pla 
Act, seeking d 
she was a mi 
those in contn 
employment c< 
as well as salE 
when the com 
firmed summa 
fendants' actio 
future suit 
course 
that, if a futur 
order a variet~ 
ages, declarati 
er' s stocks, arn 
an earlie1 
a previous vei 
liquidation of 
oppressively, ' 
restricted to i 
136. Id. at 10. 
137. See, e.g., 81 
I, 2005 WL 195059 
nority shareholder', 
at *6-9 (Wash. Ct. 
shares and paymen 
138. Fix, 538 s.1 
139. Id. at 354. 
140. Id. at 356, , 
141. Id. at 361. 
142. Id. at 357 
395-96 (Or. 1973)). 
143. Kirtz v. G 
statute has since l 
[Vol. 49:287 
granted. 128 The 
ion, finding no 
>reme Court of 
_ng the ev-
1t sufficient for 
"emedies could 
ropria te under 
·ginia's, states 
iere is oppres-
remedies other 
reasoned that 
nature."132 Re-
al courts faced 
equitable rem-
1 requir-
~ould not come 
~un the affairs 
[the] minority 
,,134 Th S 
. e cott 
2 granted as a 
_ dissolution is 
:, while Wash-
:retion to dis-
lrporation are 
e such discre-
lissolution" is 
O..pp. 1976)). 
I 387, 395-96 (Or. 
:nc., 632 P.2d 512, 
2014] NEED FOR ALTERNATNE REMEDIES 307 
necessary given the circumstances particular case.136 
court opinions have taken the supreme 
a variety remedies in oppression cases.137 
2. Missouri 
The Missouri Court of Appeals has also held that dissolution is 
not an exclusive remedy under the MBCA. 138 Fix v. Fix Materi-
al Co., the plaintiff sued under Missouri's Business Corporation 
seeking dissolution of the closely held corporation in which 
she was a minority shareholder due to oppressive conduct by 
those control.139 The plaintiff presented evidence of long-term 
employment contracts that the defendants awarded themselves 
as well as salary increases given to the defendants during years 
when the company suffered net losses. 140 Although the court af-
firmed summary judgment for the defendants, it held that the de-
fendants' actions were "narrowly close" to oppression, and that a 
future suit the plaintiff might be successful if the defendant's 
course of failed to change. 141 The Fix court ruled 
if a future suit was brought, the trial court had the power to 
order a variety of equitable remedies, including payment of dam-
ages, declaration of a dividend, buy-out of a minority sharehold-
er's stocks, if warranted, dissolution.142 
In an earlier decision, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that 
a previous version of the oppression statute, which allowed for 
liquidation of a corporation when the majority stockholders acted 
oppressively, was permissive in nature, and the courts were "not 
restricted to that remedy."143 Thus, both the Supreme Court of 
136. Id. at 10. 
137. See, e.g., Skarbo v. Skarbo Scandinavian Furniture Imp., Nos. 54288-5-I, 54470-5-
I, 2005 WL 1950599, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2005) (ordering a buy-out of the mi-
nority shareholder's shares); Snopac Prods. v. Spencer, No. 66115-9-I, 2012 WL 2688797, 
at *6-9 (Wash. Ct. App. July 9, 2012) (affirming the buyout of the minority shareholder's 
shares and payment of attorney fees as both were reasonable given the evidence). 
138. Fix, 538 S.W.2d at 356-57. 
139. Id. at 354. 
140. Id. at 356, 359. 
141. Id. at 361. 
142. Id. at 357 n.3 (quoting Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 
395-96 (Or. 1973)). 
143. Kirtz v. Grossman, 463 S.W.2d 541, 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). This liquidation 
statute has since been replaced by Missouri's adoption of the MBCA's oppression provi-
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Washington and the Missouri 
the very language of the 
of Appeals have found that 
for 
equitable remedies on its face, w1tn no 
to explicitly add additional remedies. 144 Other state courts have 
ruled similarly and allowed equitable remedies despite dissolu-
tion being the only remedy expressly available under stat-
ute.145 
C. Adding a Non-Exhaustive List of Remedies to 
Statute 
Oppression 
Other jurisdictions have modified the MBCA's oppression pro-
vision to include a list of equitable remedies that the courts 
can consider as an alternative to dissolution. 146 To further illus-
trate this point, three states will serve as 
Jersey has added a list of remedies for use in 
where the corporation has twenty-five or less 
cond, Illinois has added a non-exhaustive 
dies available oppression cases. 148 
a non-exhaustive list of equitable remedies 
Illinois' statute.149 
sion. 
144. Id.; Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 9, 10 (Wash. 2003); Fix, 538 S.W.2d at 
357. 
145. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 274 (Alaska 1980) (finding 
that Alaska's dissolution statute allowed equitable remedies). Although this case was de-
cided under prior law, Alaska's current dissolution statute is quite similar. See ALASKA 
STAT.§ 10.06.628 (2012); see also Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230, 235 (Mont. 1983) ("We 
hold that [Montana's previous oppression statute] is permissive rather than mandatory, 
and that district courts are empowered, but not required, to liquidate when corporate as-
sets have been misapplied or wasted."). Montana's legislature has since adopted a new 
statute that lists alternative remedies available to courts. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-
939 (2013). 
146. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1434 (West 2013) (providing a pre-trial buy-out 
option that is very similar to Virginia's buy-out provision, Virginia Code section 13.1-
749.1); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1434(3) (2013) (adding alternative remedies to 
Maine's oppression statute). · 
147. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:l2-7(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.). 
148. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)-(b) (2013). 
149. Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(1)-(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. 
of 2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (setting forth a non-exhaustive list of remedies available to 
shareholders of a close corporation in Oregon), with 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12.56(a)-(b) 
(2013) (setting forth a non-exhaustive list of n~medies available to shareholdes in non-
public corporations). 
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1. New Jersey 
New Jersey is one of the few states where the state legislature 
added a list of alternative remedies to MBCA. Under New 
Jersey's statute, the trial court has the authority to "appoint a 
custodian, appoint a provisional director, order a sale of the cor-
poration's stock ... , or enter a judgment dissolving the corpora-
tion .... "150 Pursuant to the statute, a provisional director ap-
pointed by a court would have all the authority and power of an 
elected director of the corporation, "including the right to notice of 
and to vote at meetings."151 Further, a custodian is given even 
more power .... 152 A custodian appointed by the court may "exer-
cise all of the powers of the corporation's board and officers to .the 
extent necessary to manage the affairs of the corporation in the 
best interests of its shareholders and creditors ... ," subject only 
to court-imposed limitations.153 New Jersey's statute makes clear 
that remedies for minority shareholder oppression are only 
able in cases where the corporation has twenty-five or less share-
holders.154 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has interpreted New 
sey's oppression provision as responding "at least in part, to 
fact that traditional principles of corporate law were often unsuc-
cessful at curbing abuses of power by majority interests close-
ly-held corporations."155 The addition of alternative remedies was 
accordingly meant to "increas[e] the willingness of courts to in-
tervene and provide relief to shareholders."156 Although expected 
to even the balance of power, the Brenner v. Berkowitz court cau-
tioned that the statute was "meant only to protect the minority, 
not to provide a weapon to enable it to obtain unfair advantage 
against the majority."157 Finally, while a review of the relevant 
authorities does not overtly shed light on why the New Jersey leg-
150. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:12-7(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.). 
151. Id.§ 14A:12-7(3). 
152. See id. § 14A:12-7(4). 
153. Id. (emphasis added). 
154. Id. § 14A:12-7(l)(c). 
155. Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1026 (N.J. 1993) (quoting Walensky v. Jona-
than Royce Int'l, Inc., 624 A.2d 613, 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)). 
156. Id. at 1032. 
157. Id. at 1030 (quoting Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close 
Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1730 (1990)). 
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islature limited the availability of alternative remedies in oppres-
sion cases to corporations with twenty-five or less shareholders, it 
is plausible that this limitation is meant to recognize the fact that 
the most vulnerable shareholders are usually those who start, or 
enter into, corporations with family and friends that are general-
ly small and have only a few shareholders. 
2. Illinois 
Illinois is another state where the legislature added additional 
remedies other than dissolution in cases of minority shareholder 
oppression. 158 Under Illinois' Business Corporation Act, the trial 
court can order a variety of remedies in oppression cases, includ-
ing removal from office of an officer or director, payment of divi-
dends, award of damages, and a buy-out. 159 Dissolution may also 
be ordered, but only if the court determines that any alternative 
remedy would be insufficient. 160 The statute goes on to state that 
the listed remedies are not exclusive. 161 Accordingly, Illinois' legis-
lature has cloaked Illinois courts with broad discretionary power 
to order appropriate remedies in minority shareholder oppression 
cases. 
Illinois' General Assembly adopted its oppression statute, along 
with the list of remedies, in response to the Illinois' courts aver-
sion toward granting relief cases where "shareholder relation-
ships broke down."162 This aversion led some "shareholders to re-
sort to 'self-help' measures," such as establishing a competing 
business, that were "injurious both to themselves and the corpo-
ration."163 Further, in interpreting the policy behind Illinois' op-
pression statute, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that the al-
ternative remedies were "specifically enacted to ... increas[e] the 
remedies available to minority shareholders and ... enlarg[e] the 
158. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.f6(a)(3) (2013). 
159. Id. §§ 5/12.56(b)(3), (b)(9)-(11). 
160. Id. § 5/12.56(b)(12). 
161. Id. § 5/12.56(c). 
162. William R. Quinlan & John F. Kennedy, The Rights and Remedies of Shareholders 
in Closely Held Corporations Under Illinois Law, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 585, 606 (1998). 
163. Id. For example, in Hagshenas v. Gaylord, the plaintiff, following the court's re-
fusal to intervene in a case involving deadlock, established a competing business and be-
gan poaching employees from the defendant's business. 557 N.E.2d 316, 318-20 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1990). 
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discretionary authority of the circuit courts to 
uations which do not warrant dissolution 
some other, less severe remedy."164 Finally, support 
alternative remedy statute, one commentator argued: 
[g]iven the infinite number of ways that business partners can op-
press each other, the Illinois statutory scheme is effective because it 
is flexible enough to preserve the assets of the corporation, and be-
cause, at the same time, it provides the disputing parties with a 
framework that allows them to work out their differences. 165 
Thus, Illinois' scheme provides a much more flexible 
for oppression cases than does Virginia's. 
3. Oregon 
311 
Finally, Oregon's statute is very similar to Illinois' oppression 
statute. 166 Oregon's oppression statute provides courts with a non-
exhaustive list of equitable remedies that courts can order. These 
remedies include alteration of the corporation's articles of incor-
poration or bylaws, 167 the removal from office of any director or of-
ficer,168 the appointment of an individual as a director or officer,169 
or the award of damages to an aggrieved party. 170 Oregon's statute 
further instructs the court that dissolution is only appropriate 
the court determines that no remedy specified in the 
subsections] or other alternative remedy is sufficient to resolve 
164. Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ill. 1996). Although the court concen-
trated on the alternative remedy statute for public corporations, the court found that its 
statutory construction "comports with the current statutory scheme regulating sharehold-
er remedies for nonpublic corporations." Id. The court further noted that the addition of 
these alternative remedies was a direct response to earlier Illinois court decisions holding 
that a shareholder in a public corporation could not be granted an alternative remedy un-
less the defendant's conduct rose to a level that justified dissolution. Id. at 1175-76; see 
also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.55 (2012) (listing remedies available to a shareholder in a 
public corporation who is alleging oppression by controlling shareholders). 
165. Quinlan & Kennedy, supra note 162, at 615. 
166. Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(1)-(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. 
of 2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (Oregon's statute regarding remedies available to shareholders 
of a closely held corporation), with 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)-(b) (2013) (Illinois' 
statute regarding remedies available to shareholders of private coporations). 
167. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.952(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of 2014 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.). 
168. Id. § 60.952(2)(c). 
169. Id. § 60.952(2)(d). 
170. Id. § 60.952(2)G). 
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the matters in dispute."171 Thus, much like Illinois, Oregon courts 
are provided with significant discretion to order a variety of rem-
edies in cases involving minority shareholder oppression. 
III. VIRGINIA'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD EXPAND THE 
REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR OPPRESSION 
Virginia's General Assembly should follow Illinois and Oregon's 
lead and add equitable remedies to the oppression statute. The 
statute should track the language of Oregon's statute by provid-
ing a list of remedies, including alteration of the corporation's ar-
ticles of incorporation or bylaws, the removal from office of any 
director or officer, the appointment of an individual as a director 
or officer, the award of damages to an aggrieved party, or the dec-
laration of dividends. The statute should also explicitly state that 
the remedies are not exclusive and dissolution should be a last 
resort option which is only ordered after the court has considered 
other remedies and deemed them insufficient. 
A. Proposed Statute for Virginia 
This proposed legislation is taken from Oregon's oppression 
statute. Although Oregon and Illinois' statute are similar in many 
aspects, for the reasons discussed below, Oregon's statute better 
addresses all the concerns raised by minority shareholder oppres-
sion. The proposed Virginia statute reads, in pertinent part: 172 
(1) In a proceeding by a shareholder in a corporation that does not 
have shares that are listed on a national securities exchange or that 
are regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more mem-
bers of a national or affiliated securities association, the circuit court 
may order one or more of the remedies listed in subsection (2) of this 
section if it is established that: 
(b) The directors or those in control of the corporation have 
acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppres-
sive or fraudulent; 
(2) The remedies that the court may order in a proceeding under 
subsection (1) of this section include but are not limited to the follow-
mg: 
171. Id. § 60.952(2)(m). 
172. This is an excerpted version of the statute. For the full version, see the Appendix. 
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(a) The performance, prohibition, alteration or setting aside of 
any action of the corporation or of its shareholders, directors or 
officers or any other party to the proceeding; 
(b) The cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corpo-
ration's articles of incorporation or bylaws; 
(c) The removal from office of any director or officer; 
(d) The appointment of any individual as a director or officer; 
(e) An accounting with respect to any matter in dispute; 
(f) The appointment of a custodian to manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation, to serve for the term and under the 
conditions prescribed by the court; 
(g) The appointment of a provisional director to serve for the 
term and under the conditions prescribed by the court; 
(h) The submission of the dispute to mediation or another form 
of nonbinding alternative dispute resolution; 
(i) The issuance of distributions; 
G) The award of damages to any aggrieved party; 
(k) The purchase by the corporation or one or more sharehold-
ers of all of the shares of one or more other shareholders for 
their fair value and on the terms determined under subsection 
(5) of this section; 
(1) The retention of jurisdiction of the case by the court for the 
protection of the shareholder who filed the proceeding; or 
(m) The dissolution of the corporation if the court determines 
that no remedy specified in paragraphs (a) to (1) of this subsec-
tion or other alternative remedy is sufficient to resolve the 
matters in dispute. In determining whether to dissolve the cor-
poration, the court shall consider among other relevant evi-
dence the financial condition of the corporation but may not re-
fuse to dissolve the corporation solely because it has 
accumulated earnings or current operating profits. 
(3) The remedies set forth in subsection (2) of this section shall not 
be exclusive of other legal and equitable remedies that the court may 
impose. Except as provided in this subsection, the shareholders of a 
corporation may, pursuant to an agreement, agree to limit or elimi-
nate any of the remedies set forth in subsection (2) of this section. 
The remedies set forth in subsection (2)(e), G) and (m) [referring to 
an accounting, an award of damages, and dissolution] of this section 
may not be eliminated. 
(4) In determining the appropriate remedies to order under subsec-
tion (2) of this section, the court may take into consideration the rea-
sonable expectations of the corporation's shareholders as they exist-
ed at the time the corporation was formed and developed during the 
course of the shareholders' relationship with the corporation and 
313 
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with each other. The court shall endeavor to minimize the harm to 
the business of the corporation. 173 
As previously mentioned, Oregon and oppression stat-
utes are, many respects, mirror images of each other. 174 Ore-
gon's statute, however, does have one significant difference that 
Virginia should adopt. Under Oregon's statute, shareholders are 
allowed to "eliminate any of the remedies" by agreement, except 
for the award of damages, an accounting, or dissolution. 175 As dis-
cussed in more detail below, 176 this section helps to relieve some of 
the concerns raised by those skeptical of expanding the statutory 
remedies available to trial courts in minority shareholder oppres-
sion cases. Virginia would do well to follow suit adopt the 
proposed statute containing a similar provision. 
B. Benefits of Expanding the Statutory Remedies in Oppression 
Cases 
Courts in other states have found that the MBCA allows for 
remedies besides dissolution, including buy-outs and the ap-
pointment of custodial receivers to monitor the corporation. 177 
Courts in these states have allowed for other remedies because, 
among other reasons: (i) additional options increases the likeli-
hood that a judge will order an effective remedy, (ii) the courts 
should offer some protection to minority shareholders who inherit 
their shares or fail to protect themselves when they enter into a 
closely corporation, and (iii) less drastic remedies help pre-
vent power imbalances that are too favor of either the 
shareholder or the minority shareholder. 
173. As a note, Virginia's pre-trial buy-out statute would still be an option to the de-
fendants or the corporation as a way to end litigation prior to a trial. VA. CODE ANN. § 
13.1-749.l (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
174. Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of 
2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (setting forth the remedies available to shareholders of a closely 
held corporation), with 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a) (2013) (setting forth the remedies 
available to shareholders of a private coporation). 
175. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(3) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of 2014 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.). 
176. See infra Part III(B). 
177. See supra Parts II(B), (C). 
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1. Alternative Remedies Increase the Likelihood of an Effective 
Remedy Being Ordered 
First, additional remedies increase the likelihood that a judge 
will order an effective remedy, thereby giving greater protection 
to minority shareholders. 178 In a study that analyzed forty-seven 
court decisions involving minority shareholder oppression be-
tween 1984 and 1985, buy-outs were the most common remedy 
ordered, comprising 54% of the cases, with dissolution only being 
ordered ten of the cases (or 27%) and other relief besides disso-
lution or buy-outs being ordered in three other cases (8%).179 
Thus, a buy-out was the predominant remedy ordered jurisdic-
tions that allowed equitable remedies. Another study confirmed 
this conclusion, finding that 54% of cases initiated between 1960 
and 1976 ended a buy-out, even in cases where the court de-
nied the plaintiffs relief.18° Further, the 1985 study found that 
buy-outs were most common in cases involving a family owned 
business. 181 With buy-outs being so common, courts should be giv-
en the ability to order this remedy. 
As discussed above, Virginia already has a pre-trial buy-out op-
tion.182 Thus, it would appear that Virginia has provided the most 
common alternative remedy and no additional change is neces-
sary. However, while pre-trial buy-outs are an option that de-
fendants and corporations should have available to them, some 
might decide instead to proceed to trial. 183 Under the current 
statutory regime, once the defendant and corporation have decid-
ed to forego a pre-trial buy-out, the only other remedy available is 
dissolution. 184 The pre-trial buy-out, therefore, does nothing to 
178. Haynsworth, supra note 5, at 26. 
179. Id. at 51, 53. 
180. J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, flliquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed 
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 30, 33 
(1977). 
181. Haynsworth, supra note 5, at 56. 
182. VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-749.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013); supra Part I(C). 
183. For example, in Colgate u. Disthene Group, the Disthene Group and its sharehold-
ers chose not to accept a pre-trial settlement or elect to buy-out the plaintiffs. See general-
ly supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Colgate case and pointing out 
that the litigation ended in a large buy-out settlement but only after a trial on the merits, 
and after the subsequent appeal had been granted). 
184. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-749.l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013); id. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 
2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). A plaintiff does not have the option to force a pre-trial buy-out 
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remedy the court's reluctance to order dissolution nor does it help 
protect minority shareholders should the majority not want to 
them out. 
2. Courts Should Provide Some Protection to Minority 
Shareholders Who Fail to Protect Themselves or Who Inherit 
Their Shares 
Second, the General Assembly should recognize the realities of 
human psychology; that is, that people are inherently optimistic 
about their own future. 185 Although most minority shareholders 
have the opportunity to protect themselves prior to purchasing 
shares, with the exception being shareholders who are gifted or 
inherit their stock, many fail to do so. 186 Even well-educated peo-
ple might get caught up in the romanticism of starting a business 
with their friends or family and, in so doing, decide that the costs 
of protection (including hiring an attorney to draft employment or 
buy-sell agreements) outweigh any potential risk-especially 
when the probabilities of those risks are so far-fetched in the sub-
jective minds of the would-be minority shareholders. 187 Further, 
there is still the segment of minority shareholders who do not 
have the opportunity to protect themselves because they either 
inherited or were gifted their stock. 188 These individuals may have 
by the defendant or the corporation. Id.§ 13.1-749.l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
185. Molitor, supra note 2, at 554. 
186. See id. at 495-96, 554. 
187. Moll, supra note 30, at 912; see also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558 
(N.C. 1983) (observing that "close corporations are often formed by friends or family mem-
bers who simply may not believe that disagreements could ever arise"). Further, some in-
dividuals might not be comfortable raising the issue of potential future conflict and protec-
tive agreements, especially when their partners are friends or family. Although clearly not 
the exact same situation, it is interesting to consider the unpopularity of prenuptial 
agreements even when a person's financial security is at stake. See Beth Potier, For Many, 
Prenups Seem to Predict Doom, HARV. U. GAZETTE (Oct. 16, 2003), http://www.news.har 
vard.edu/gazette/2003/10.16/01-prenup.html. Although this might seem like an almost 
laughable comparison in the world of business, it is important to remember the kinds of 
people who are more likely to get caught in a cycle of oppression: individuals who do not 
have business backgrounds and start a company with their friends or family. See Molitor, 
supra note 2, at 491, 554. Thus, minority shareholders, if aware of the types of protection 
available, may be uncomfortable raising these issues and instead decide to forego an un-
comfortable conversation with the hope and beliefthat no issues will arise in the future. 
188. Some may argue that, although the descendants had no opportunity to protect 
themselves, the original shareholder who bequeathed the minority shares did have such 
an opportunity and failed to secure any protection. Thus, Guy Dixon, who originally 
bought the kyanite mine and founded the Disthene Group, had the opportunity to leave 
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a large portion or even all of their inheritance tied up in a corpo-
ration, with no hope of liquidating any of the inheritance without 
the approval of the majority shareholder. For example, the minor-
ity shareholders in Colgate inherited millions in non-voting stock 
from their grandfather.189 Although the minority shareholders 
proposed a buy-out and offered the majority shareholder a set-
tlement after the case was initiated, the majority shareholders re-
fused. 
3. Less Drastic Remedies Help Prevent Power Imbalances 
Finally, in some circumstances, a court that finds a majority 
shareholder's actions concerning, but not rising to the level where 
dissolution would be appropriate, has no other remedies to offer 
the plaintiff.190 Because of this, majority shareholders might be 
rewarded for bad behavior that is just shy of continual oppres-
sion. As some scholars have pointed out, courts are reluctant to 
order the drastic remedy of dissolution unless there is clear evi-
dence of continued oppression.191 This reluctance to order dissolu-
tion undermines the very purpose of the oppression statute-that 
is, to protect minority shareholders. 192 Accordingly, alternative 
remedies are necessary to provide courts with flexibility to re-
spond to the various circumstances presented in a case. 
his son and daughter an equal share of the business, but chose to create a majority share-
holder and minority shareholder. Colgate v. Disthene Grp., Inc., 85 Va. Cir. 286, 287 
(2012) (Buckingham County). This argument ignores the fact that most individuals do not 
foresee future problems arising from a minority shareholder situation, particularly in a 
family situation where the inheriting parties are siblings or otherwise related. 
189. McKelway, Mining Case Going to Virginia Supreme Court, supra note 85. The Dis-
thene Group was worth an estimated $200 million; the plaintiffs owned 42% of the stock. 
Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 287. 
190. Hetherinton & Dooley, supra note 180, at 9-11 (An oppression action under the 
MBCA "require[s] the minority to establish that the majority's conduct is sufficiently cul-
pable to give rise to an action for damages at common law ... [even in cases involving] 
disputable value judgments where courts are traditionally reluctant to interfere with 
management decisions."). 
191. See, e.g., Moll, supra note 30 at 893-94; see Drastic Times, supra note 7; see also 
Scott v. Trans-System, 64 P.3d 1, 10 (Wash. 2003) (finding that the defendants' conduct 
did not rise to the continuous level necessary to justify dissolution of the corporation). 
192. Although plaintiffs may also bring fiduciary duty claims, the only additional rem-
edy available to them is damages. While paying damages may bring about a change in the 
corporate culture, a fiduciary duty claim does not allow a court to judicially sever ties be-
tween the minority shareholder and the corporation, a remedy that might be necessary 
given the souring of relationships that led to the lawsuit in the first place. 
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C. Counter-Arguments to Adding Equitable Remedies to 
Virginia's Oppression Statute 
[Vol. 49:287 
Those critical of adding equitable remedies to the oppression 
provision in Virginia's dissolution statute, or alternatively adopt-
ing an independent oppression statute, offer several counter-
arguments against doing so. Those counter-arguments include: (i) 
there are very few cases that actually proceed to trial, (ii) minori-
ty shareholders should protect themselves, and (iii) allowing al-
ternative remedies puts too much power in the hands of the judi-
ciary to essentially oversee businesses. 
1. Few Cases Actually Advance to Trial 
Very few cases alleging minority shareholder oppression are 
actually brought Virginia, raising the question of whether ad-
ditional remedies are necessary to handle so few cases. Indeed, 
since 2005, when the Virginia General Assembly allowed pre-trial 
buy-out options, only two cases alleging oppression have gone to 
trial. 193 Further, some may argue that a minority shareholder is 
not bound to bring a dissolution cause of action as his only hope 
for remedying a case of oppression; instead, minority sharehold-
ers may also bring fiduciary duty claims or other business tort 
claims. 
Colgate, one of only two cases brought following the enact-
ment the pre-trial buyout option in Virginia, the minority 
shareholders also brought a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
against the majority shareholders, 194 who were also directors. Un-
der Virginia Code section 13.1-690, "[a] director shall discharge 
his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a 
committee, accordance with his good faith business judgment 
the best interests of the corporation."195 They likely would have 
won at the court level on a fiduciary duty claim. The Colgate 
court found that the business judgment rule did not protect the 
majority shareholders since "Disthene's board of directors did not 
193. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-749.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013); Cattano v. Bragg, 283 Va. 638, 
727 S.E.2d 625 (2013); Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 286. 
194. Although fiduciary duty claims were brought, the parties agreed to litigate the 
oppression claims first. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 288-90. 
195. VA. CODEAi'JN. § 13.l-690(A) (Rep!. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). 
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act as a board and make informed decisions."196 Further, the trial 
court went on to find that the board "merely bent to [the majority 
shareholder's] ironhanded will and rubberstamped his decisions," 
and that "[the majority shareholder and his son] were motivated 
not by the best interests of the corporation, but by their personal 
best interests."197 
A fiduciary duty claim, however, would not have ended the 
family dispute. Although a successful fiduciary duty claim would 
have provided the plaintiffs with a steady stream of income, it 
might not have stopped continued oppression by the majority 
shareholders. While this theory is necessarily speculative, the 
majority shareholders' past actions show a pattern of continued 
oppression unheeded by judicial action. Several years before the 
oppression lawsuit, the Colgate plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging 
the looting of the plaintiffs stock, which the majority shareholder 
moved out of the family trust and placed into one of the corpora-
tion's many holdings. 198 Following a ruling for the plaintiffs and a 
severe rebuking from the bench, the defendant majority share-
holders agreed to settle the case. 199 Despite the consequences of 
the trust litigation, the majority shareholders soon cut the plain-
tiffs dividends while increasing their own pay and bonuses.200 The 
majority shareholders' continued oppressive conduct eventually 
led to the dissolution lawsuit. 201 Thus, as the Colgate case shows, 
equitable remedies are necessary to adequately respond to the 
cases that appear before Virginia courts. 
2. Minority Shareholders Can Protect Themselves with Contracts 
Another argument offered is that, in most cases, minority 
shareholders can protect themselves by entering into employment 
agreements, buy-sell agreements, and other contracts prior to in-
vesting in a corporation. Unfortunately, human nature leads in-
experienced investors to be overly optimistic of the business's 
196. 
197. 
198. 
199. 
200. 
201. 
Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 294. 
Id. 
Id. at 288; see McKelway, Chase City Man, supra note 70. 
McKelway, Chase City Man, supra note 70; see Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 288. 
Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 289. 
Id. 
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likely success and too trusting of their business partners. 202 For 
example, in the hypothetical discussed in Part I, 203 C invested in a 
corporation with two of his friends. C believed that, as an equal 
owner, his status as an employee of the corporation was protected 
and did not protect himself with a buy-sell agreement or an em-
ployment contract. Unfortunately for C, his employee status was 
not protected and business conflicts led A and B to agree to fire C 
and cut dividend payments. 
In order to prevent future investors from making the same mis-
takes as C, some scholars argue that business owners should be 
required to learn about ways to protect themselves prior to enter-
ing into a business agreement. 204 Prospective owners of a corpora-
tion could be required to read a document that outlines potential 
risks and ways to protect against those risks prior to being able to 
register a corporation. 205 These documents would be maintained 
by the state and made available on the state's website.206 
This approach, however, would not work for individuals who 
inherited a corporation, like the plaintiffs in Colgate. It was, in 
fact, the original owner of the corporation (the plaintiffs' grandfa-
ther and defendant's father) who left them with a minori-
ty/majority shareholder situation, instead of giving each line of 
descendants an equal share in the corporation. 207 Yet, requiring 
some education prior to the registration of a closely held corpora-
tion would probably reduce the likelihood of oppression and would 
lessen the need for alternatives to dissolution. 
Further, the proposed statute would allow savvy shareholders 
to protect themselves with contracts on the front end while also 
protecting those shareholders that did not foresee potential prob-
lems or who were unable to protect themselves. 208 The proposed 
legislation allows shareholders to agree to eliminate all the alter-
native remedies listed, excepting the award of damages, an ac-
202. Thompson, supra note 1, at 705; see also supra notes 185-87 and accompanying 
text. 
203. See supra Part I(A). 
204. See Molitor, supra note 2, at 496. 
205. See id. 
206. See id. at 575. 
207. Colgate v. Disthene Grp., Inc., 85 Va. Cir. 286, 288 (2012) (Buckingham County). 
208. See supra Part III(A). 
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counting, or dissolution.209 Thus, shareholders who do not want 
these alternative remedies to be available in any future disputes 
can contract away. This does not hinder the statute's main 
goal-protection of minority shareholders-because those share-
holders are agreeing to terms up front instead of informally form-
ing a corporation with very little protection. 
Finally, the proposed statute helps prevent an imbalance of 
power in favor of the minority shareholder, who could threaten 
havoc with an oppression suit. With alternative remedies availa-
ble, courts that were once hesitant to provide any remedy because 
the only remedy was dissolution may now be more willing to or-
der lesser remedies. The increased likelihood of some sort of rem-
edy being awarded to plaintiff increases the power of the mi-
nority shareholder. 210 Allowing for an opt-out of almost all the 
remedies restores that balance of power while also ensuring that 
the minority shareholder understands the vulnerability of his po-
sition prior to exchanging consideration for stock. 
3. Allowing Alternative Remedies Places Too Much Power in the 
Hands of the Judiciary 
A final argument against expanding equitable remedies in mi-
nority shareholder oppression cases is that doing so increases the 
judiciary's power and allows a judge to essentially oversee busi-
nesses. It is certainly true that cases that might have previously 
been dismissed because the judge was reluctant to order dissolu-
tion may now instead see a ruling favor of the plaintiff with an 
equitable remedy ordered. However, the business judgment rule 
still applies in cases of oppression and still creates a presumption 
that a director has acted "in accordance with his good faith busi-
ness judgment of the best interests of the corporation."211 It is not 
209. See supra Part III(A). 
210. As one scholar pointed out, '"[t]raditional litigation of such shareholder disputes 
may be the legal equivalent of killing the goose that lays the golden egg."' In such circum-
stances, "[b]y the time the parties' rights are finally adjudicated, the company may be 
damaged beyond repair: Working relationships are destroyed; legal fees and costs are 
crushing; and key employees are distracted from attending to the needs of the enterprise 
and its customers." Marmaduke, supra note 115. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the 
corporation and the majority shareholders to avoid litigation when possible, giving the 
conniving minority shareholder the power to hold the corporation hostage to potential liti-
gation. 
211. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). 
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until after the plaintiff has rebutted this presumption and proven 
oppression that a judge can grant equitable remedies. 212 Equitable 
remedies thus protect minority shareholders while not overstep-
ping or overruling the business judgment rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Currently, minority shareholders who allege oppression in Vir-
ginia may only request dissolution as a remedy.213 While many 
states, either through legislation or case law, have found that 
courts have the power to order remedies other than dissolution,214 
the Supreme Court of Virginia has otherwise. 215 Thus, 
supreme court has placed the ball squarely in the General As-
sembly's court-if additional remedies are to be provided, it must 
be the General Assembly who acts to change the statute and ex-
plicitly allow such remedies. Legislatures in other states, such as 
Oregon, have done just that by adding a non-exhaustive list of al-
ternative remedies to their dissolution statutes cases of minori-
ty shareholder oppression.216 The General Assembly should follow 
Oregon's lead by adopting the proposed oppression statute or, at 
the very least, adding equitable remedies to the dissolution stat-
ute, thereby granting Virginia's trial courts the discretionary 
power to order an appropriate remedy based on the unique facts 
of a case. 
212. As one of the plaintiff's attorneys in Colgate noted, "[u]ntil now, majority share-
holders at many companies in Virginia and elsewhere have been able to run a company for 
their own benefit while running roughshod over minority shareholders." Disthene Group 
Settlement Bolsters Minority Shareholders' Rights, LECLAIRRYAN (Aug. 22, 2013), http: 
//www.leclairryan.com/news/xprNewsDetail.aspx?xpST=NewsDetail&news=1007. 
213. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text. 
214. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1250(b) (2013); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 
S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 3 (Wash. 
2003). 
215. White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 135, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972). 
216. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 60.952(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of 
2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.). 
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APPENDIX-PROPOSED DRAFT STATUTE 
The full proposed statute would read: 
(1) In a proceeding by a shareholder in a corporation that does not 
have shares that are listed on a national securities exchange or that 
are regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more mem-
bers of a national or affiliated securities association, the circuit court 
may order one or more of the remedies listed in subsection (2) of this 
section if it is established that: 
(a) The directors are deadlocked in the management of the cor-
porate affairs, the shareholders are unable to break the dead-
lock and irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or 
being suffered, or the business and affairs of the corporation 
can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the sharehold-
ers generally, because of the deadlock; 
(b) The directors or those in control of the corporation have 
acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppres-
sive or fraudulent; 
(c) The shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and have 
failed, for a period that includes at least two consecutive annu-
al meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms 
have expired; or 
(d) The corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted. 
(2) The remedies that the court may order in a proceeding under 
subsection (1) of this section include but are not limited to the follow-
ing: 
(a) The performance, prohibition, alteration or setting aside of 
any action of the corporation or of its shareholders, directors or 
officers or any other party to the proceeding; 
(b) The cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corpo-
ration's articles of incorporation or bylaws; 
(c) The removal from office of any director or officer; 
(d) The appointment of any individual as a director or officer; 
(e) An accounting with respect to any matter in dispute; 
(f) The appointment of a custodian to manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation, to serve for the term and under the 
conditions prescribed by the court; 
(g) The appointment of a provisional director to serve for the 
term and under the conditions prescribed by the court; 
(h) The submission of the dispute to mediation or another form 
of nonbinding alternative dispute resolution; 
(i) The issuance of distributions; 
G) The award of damages to any aggrieved party; 
(k) The purchase by the corporation or one or more sharehold-
ers of all of the shares of one or more other shareholders for 
323 
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their fair value and on the terms determined under subsection 
(5) of this section; 
(1) The retention of jurisdiction of the case by the court for the 
protection of the shareholder who filed the proceeding; or 
(m) The dissolution of the corporation if the court determines 
that no remedy specified in paragraphs (a) to (1) of this subsec-
tion or other alternative remedy is sufficient to resolve the 
matters in dispute. In determining whether to dissolve the cor-
poration, the court shall consider among other relevant evi-
dence the financial condition of the corporation but may not re-
fuse to dissolve the corporation solely because it has 
accumulated earnings or current operating profits. 
(3) The remedies set forth in subsection (2) of this section shall not 
be exclusive of other legal and equitable remedies that the court may 
impose. Except as provided in this subsection, the shareholders of a 
corporation may, pursuant to an agreement, agree to limit or elimi-
nate any of the remedies set forth in subsection (2) of this section. 
The remedies set forth in subsection (2)(e), G) and (m) [referring to 
an accounting, an award of damages, and dissolution] of this section 
may not be eliminated. 
(4) In determining the appropriate remedies to order under subsec-
tion (2) of this section, the court may take into consideration the rea-
sonable expectations of the corporation's shareholders as they exist-
ed at the time the corporation was formed and developed during the 
course of the shareholders' relationship with the corporation and 
with each other. The court shall endeavor to minimize the harm to 
the business of the corporation. 
(5)(a) If the court orders a share purchase, the court shall: 
(i) Determine the fair value of the shares, with or without the 
assistance of appraisers, taking into account any impact on the 
value of the shares resulting from the actions giving rise to a 
proceeding under subsection (1) of this section; 
(ii) Consider any financial or legal constraints on the ability of 
the corporation or the purchasing shareholder to purchase the 
shares; 
(iii) Specify the terms of the purchase, including, if appropri-
ate, terms for installment payments, interest at the rate and 
from the date determined by the court to be equitable, subor-
dination of the purchase obligation to the rights of the corpora-
tion's other creditors, security for a deferred purchase price 
and a covenant not to compete or other restriction on the seller; 
(iv) Require the seller to deliver all of the seller's shares to the 
purchaser upon receipt of the purchase price or the first in-
stallment of the purchase price; and 
(v) Retain jurisdiction to enforce the purchase order by, among 
other remedies, ordering the corporation to be dissolved if the 
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purchase is not completed in accordance with the terms of the 
purchase order. 
(A) The share purchase ordered under this subsection 
shall be consummated within 20 days after the date the 
order becomes final unless before that time the corpora-
tion files with the court a notice of its intention to dis-
solve and articles of dissolution are properly filed with 
the Secretary of State within 50 days after filing the no-
tice with the court. 
(B) After the purchase order is entered and before the 
purchase price is fully paid, any party may petition the 
court to modify the terms of the purchase, and the court 
may do so if the court finds that the modifications are 
equitable. 
(C) Unless the purchase order is modified by the court, 
the selling shareholder shall have no further rights as a 
shareholder from the date the seller delivers all of the 
shareholder's shares to the purchaser or such other date 
specified by the court. 
(6) In any proceeding under subsection (1) of this section, the court 
shall allow reasonable compensation to the custodian, provisional di-
rector, appraiser or other such person appointed by the court for ser-
vices rendered and reimbursement or direct payment of reasonable 
costs and expenses. Amounts described in this subsection shall be 
paid by the corporation. 
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